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Law and the Gendered Politics of Identity: Who 
Owns the Label "Lesbian"? 
Elvia R. Arriola * 
Several years ago, I was a member of a predominantly lesbian women's 
support group. The group offered a "womanspace" for individuals who 
wanted to share their experiences, strength, and hope as survivors of rape 
and sexual abuse. On a weekly basis, anywhere from fifteen to thirty 
women of all racial, ethnic and social backgrounds, who knew each other 
only by first name, rented a meeting room from a community church and 
shared stories of sexual victimization and abuse, with the singular goal of 
healing themselves through mutual support. I As women revealed long-
buried traumatic events, they also reflected on how the low self-esteem 
caused by the sexual abuse had resulted in failed relationships, lost jobs, de-
pression, workaholism, and repeated efforts to "get one's life together." The 
sharing often evoked emotional responses, as women recalled their own se-
crets of incest by fathers, brothers, uncles, and male cousins. Realizing the 
source of their conflicted lives, they learned to express long-repressed feel-
ings concerning both their abusers and the families they had tried to protect 
or who had not believed them. Newcomers heard from women who had 
turned their lives around as they put an end to denial by ending abusive rela-
tionships, seeking therapy, or ending the alcohol or drug dependency they 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin, J.D., University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley, M.A. (History), New York University, B.A., California State Univer-
sity, former Assistant Attorney General, New York Civil Rights Bureau. I am greatly in-
debted to my friends and colleagues Frank Valdes, Berta Hernandez-Truyol, Mary 
Coombs, Robert Jensen, Sandy Levinson, Ernest Smith, Jack Getman, Gerald Torres, Mi-
chael Olivas and Phyllis Frye, Esq. for their support and comments in the production of 
this essay. I am also grateful for the support of my research assistants Lucie Jones, J.D. 
1997 and Virginia Heimsath, J.D. 1996, as well as to Lisa Hardie, J.D. 1997, The Uni-
versity of Texas. My thanks also to the insights of my editor, Hasan Shafiqullah. An ear-
lier and much shorter version of this essay, entitled "Getting Possessive about the Tenn 
'Lesbian, '" is forthcoming by Routledge Press in 1997, in Seductions of Justice: Lesbian 
Legal Theories and Practices by Professor Ruthann Robson of CUNY Law School. My 
special thanks to Ruthann for soliciting my contribution to that anthology. 
1. The group had adapted the 12-step program of Alcoholics Anonymous, which offers 
a spiritual basis for recovering from addictions such as alcoholism and other compUlsive 
behaviors. 
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL 
2 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8: 1 
had used to cover up their pain. In the company of other survivors, the 
women felt safe enough, sometimes for the first time in their adult lives, to 
weep or get angry; for in this safe space they trusted that their companions 
would not mock, negate, or minimize their feelings. Of course, the critical 
sense of safety was ensured by the practice of someone standing guard at the 
door to make sure no man accidentally walked into the rented rooms. If that 
happened, all talk would suspend until the man was gone. This ground rule 
grew out of the plainly obvious fact that this was a meeting for women 
healing from sexual abuse by the men in their lives; only an all-women at-
mosphere could guarantee an emotionally safe environment. 
Imagine, then, the turmoil created in this "womanspace" when one day a 
tall, quiet woman who had shown up regularly at meetings for several weeks 
suddenly came out to the group as a transsexual female. Not only that, she 
was a transsexual female who identified as a lesbian. Suddenly "Micki,,,2 
who had simply appeared as an unusually tall, rather quiet and profession-
ally dressed woman, looked very different to the group's members. Some of 
the women were too involved with their own issues to take in immediately 
what had just happened. In the following weeks, however, a few women, 
both lesbian and not, reacted strongly, sharing that they felt threatened by 
Micki's continued presence. Micki' s feminine appearance bore witness to 
the wonders of modem medicine, but to some she was nothing but a fake. 
Her revelation explained at last the slightly masculine build around the 
shoulders and neck: this supposed woman was a man, or at least had been 
born male. Further, although she had given up her male identity, Micki's 
self confident demeanor betrayed residual hints of her socialization as a 
privileged white male. 
Her chosen identity as a lesbian posed another gender and sexuality 
enigma. Having castrated "his" penis while leaving "his" sexual orientation 
unscathed, to what label was slbe entitled? The choice of a lesbian identity 
to express her (hi s ) new identity as a "woman-loving-woman" communicated 
an unfamiliar sex and gender ambiguity. For some, the ambiguity only gen-
erated hostility and feelings of mockery for this once-man's appropriation of 
a label-lesbian---which they felt belonged only to "real women." 
In the conflict and confusion that surfaced for several weeks after her 
coming out, Micki encountered both support and prejudice from fellow 
members of the incest survivors' group. A few sought out Micki' s friend-
ship, trying to assure her that she was welcome. Others kept their distance 
and in private conversations voiced their distrust and interest in removing 
Micki from the group. They felt abandoned by their group, angry and en-
raged that not everyone agreed that Micki should leave. Too many indi-
viduals supported Micki to force a formal demand that she leave and not 
come back. The resistors expressed a sense of betrayal by the group's un-
2. To preserve her anonymity, the name "Micki" appears as a pseudonym. 
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willingness to oust Micki, whose perceived crime was in once having had a 
penis and now being viewed as neither truly female, nor woman, nor lesbian. 
She was at best a not-man. Eventually, the conflict led to a split, as Micki's 
resistors formed their own group, with membership limited to women who 
had been born into a female body. Micki herself eventually left the group. 
She ultimately formed her own support group, focusing on gender identity 
and abuse issues.3 
I have resurrected my memories of the events surrounding Micki's pres-
ence in the support group to introduce what has consistently been a contro-
versial issue among lesbian/gay and feminist audiences--that it is a signifi-
cant theoretical task for lesbian/gay and/or feminist scholars to connect their 
theorizing to the efforts of transgender4 scholars and activists who advocate 
the creation of a society without rigid categories of identity and desire. 5 
Micki's identity defied the socially created categories of identity and desire. 
3. Micki' s group was one of the first 12-step groups dealing with gender identity and 
abuse issues in New York City. It evolved into a transgender support group and a gender 
identity project housed in New York's Lesbian and Gay Community Center. Telephone 
Interview with Lesbian and Gay Community Center Staff (Aug. 7, 1996). 
4. I have previously used the term transgendered to signify an individual whose per-
sonal and/or political identity appears to undermine a fundamental premise of a gender 
polarized culture--that people exist on only one side or the other of a masculine/male and 
feminine/female identity split (e.g., bearded women, male cross-dressers), or whose iden-
tity (e.g., transsexuals), demeanor and/or behavior defies a social/moral/cultural gendered 
bipolar value system which enforces the belief that the two biological sexes, male or fe-
male, are allowed only two gender identities and roles: man or woman. These roles and 
identities are confined to limited expressions (embodying the ideals of "real manhood" or 
"real womanhood") in the areas of dress, social conduct, sexual behavior, or intimacy. The 
original thoughts which birthed an earlier essay and this paper grew out of a panel speech. 
See Elvia R. Arriola, I Feel Like A(n) (Un)Natural Woman: Transgenderism and Anti-
Discrimination Law and Theory, Panel Speech at the Texas Journal of Women and the 
Law Symposium (Oct. 1994). 
In a different but related vein, the term transgender is a political activist term which 
includes "male and female cross-dressers, transvestites, female and male impersonators, 
pre-operative and post-operative transsexuals, transsexuals who choose not to have genital 
reconstruction, and all persons whose perceived gender or anatomic sex may conflict with 
their gender expression, such as masculine-appearing women and feminine-appearing 
men." See Transgender Inclusion and the ENDA Bill, THE ICTLEP REp. (Int'l Conf. on 
Transgender L. & Employment Pol'y, Inc., Houston, Tex.), Nov. 1995-Jan. 1996, at 7 
(citing Investigation Into Discrimination Against Transgendered People: Hearings Before 
the Human Rights Commission of the City and County of San Francisco (1994 ) (on file 
with author». The term genderqueers also appears in transgender activist literature to 
capture the wide diversity of those who undermine the impact of gender bipolarity in the 
culture. See also infra notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text. 
5. JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: MEANING, MYTHS AND SEXU-
ALITIES 176-81 (1985). Weeks argues that the history of sexuality undermines any neat 
dichotomy between sex and society; rather the body, as a site of the deployment of power 
relations, has become the source of variant forms of sexual expression which, in theory, 
reflect one sexuality but which are really multiple sexualities, defined by class, religion, 
ethnicity, race, etc. He also argues that Western cultures obviously derive their views of 
legitimate and illegitimate eroticism and/or sexual identities from the hegemonic model of 
male heterosexuality. Id. 
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Her identity invited not only prejudice but also confusion, as women divided 
on questions of how one should impute the identity of "woman" in order to 
maintain group stability, whether to support or oppose Micki' s presence, 
how to address the concerns of the outraged and fearful women, and how to 
determine what the group meant when it passed the ground rule "no men al-
lowed." The group that had voiced intolerance of the opposition to Micki's 
continued membership argued that her opponents had become too possessive 
about the labels "lesbian," "woman," and "female." But this was not a 
space for theory. This was a space for the realm of emotions, which defy 
the logic of labels and categories. 6 And yet the experience of that room, 
particularly the feelings of irrational fear and prejudice which split the 
group, illustrate in microcosm the societal confusion that is generated when, 
without warning, one is confronted by individuals who transgress society's 
gender laws and assumptions and force a re-examination of the meaning of 
such labels as "man," "woman," "lesbian," "female," "male," and so on. 
Whether Micki ever really understood or even accepted as legitimate the 
view that some women could not feel safe in her presence is not the imme-
diate focus of this inquiry. In this Article I am interested in exploring the 
unconscious beliefs and cultural attitudes that explain the resistance to in-
cluding someone like Micki, despite the group's initial perception of her as a 
woman. 7 In recent years, a grassroots trans gender movement has pressured 
6. The distinction I make here between emotion and logic pertains strictly to my obser-
vations of the thinking processes of the women in this particular support group about this 
particular event. These women were not discussing the meaning of identity in order to ac-
complish some political agenda or defend against an alleged claim of discrimination. In-
stead, they looked at the situation as an individualized and personal experience, as defined 
by their particular need for healing in a group setting, their experiences as women, and 
presumably their unarticulated assumptions about society's gendered norms. 
Arguably, the increasing use of the personal narrative in legal scholarship has 
eroded the strict boundaries between emotion and logic. See Lynne N. Henderson, Legal-
ity and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1574-77 (1987) (describing empathy created by 
storytelling as a way of knowing that can explode the accepted knowledge of structures, 
categories and the relationship between the law and society). It is in the vein of providing 
the shock of new information that I offer my story, with its clear emotional packaging, as a 
way of exploring the difficult theoretical questions which surround the gendered politics of 
identity. 
7. I realize that there may be a profound legal and moral/ethical distinction between an 
incest survivor's support group retaining some right to reject an individual like Micki, and 
large feminist organizations rejecting the membership of transsexual females (for instance, 
the Michigan Womyn's Music Festival, a situation on which I focused when I first ex-
plored this topic). Arguably, the success of an incest survivor's support group depends 
upon making certain discriminations which are not solely based on prejudice. From this 
angle, regardless of Micki's sense of self as a woman, one could argue that the phantom 
presence of her former male genitalia created an unacceptable tension between Micki's 
self-identity as a woman, and the group's "all-female/woman" identity. Thus the phantom 
penis may have triggered undesired memories and/or chilled the very talk the women 
needed in order to heal. Of course, not all women had such an experience, no doubt be-
cause the abuse patterns discussed in the group never fell into a clear gendered pattern of 
male versus female. Sometimes perpetrators were of both genders; sometimes they were 
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both feminist and lesbian/gay organizations to include transgendered women 
and men in their political and legal activism. 8 Observing the resistance to 
this movement strictly from my own experience, I devote my discussion to 
five issues: a) how Micki' s story not only challenges the meaning of the 
feminist category "woman," but also how the resistance to people like her 
unduly narrows the meaning of "gender oppression;" b) the resistance to the 
topic of transgenderism by lesbians as an illustration of the interconnected 
meaning of oppression based on gender, sexuality, race/ethnicity or class; c) 
the potential for divisiveness in a non-inclusive politics of identity as illus-
trated by the resistance to transgenders; d) the meaning of sex/gender bipo-
larity and the interconnections between feminism, homophobia and trans-
gender discrimination; and e) an appeal for holism in the politics of identity. 
I. WHO IS THE "WOMAN," IN THE QUEST TO UNDO 
GENDER OPPRESSION? 
Looking back on the events surrounding Micki' s revelation, I remember 
well how I too had seen a "woman" until she revealed her former "male" 
identity. Micki's looks and her demeanor said "woman." Other character-
istics signaled education, white privilege and professionalism; timidity about 
the subject of incest, but a general tone of self-confidence in her speech. 
Once my perceptions did not match what I knew, I was left with my curios-
ity for identifying the gender ambiguities, the residual physical signs of the 
malehood Micki had given up some fifteen years prior. By leaving to form 
another support group, Micki opened the door for healing from incest and 
sexual abuse to other transsexual females. Yet, the women who separated 
from the original group never had to examine the source of their fears. No 
one thOUght to ask whether some of their reactions to Micki, based upon 
preconceived ideas about the meaning of sex, gender or sexuality, might 
have stemmed from the same hetero-patriarchal value system which ac-
counted for their own sexual victimization.9 Certainly no one felt the need to 
strictly female. 
As mentioned above, Micki eventually formed her own support group, which obvi-
ously has the potential for a group therapy process conducive of the kind of consciousness-
raising that feminists have urged for deconstructing gender oppression and politically em-
powering its victims. 
8. The first attempt for inclusion occurred at the National Lesbian and Gay Law Asso-
ciation's Lavender Law Conference on October 23, 1994, in Portland, Oregon. NGLTF 
Opens Employment Doors for ICTLEP, ICTLEP PRESS RELEASE (Houston, Tex.), May 1, 
1995. 
9. Frank Valdes describes the components of a hetero-patriarchal value system as de-
pendent on a conflated understanding of sex, gender and sexuality (sex = gender = sexual 
orientation). Gender, though often couched in masculine/feminine terms, is also cast offi-
cially and culturally in the hetero-patriarchal value system as resting on an active/passive 
paradigm. Because it also serves as the foundation of social order, the paradigm which 
conflates sex and gender also posits active roles for males/men and passive roles for fe-
males/women, and sexual roles in which masculinity is active while femininity is passive. 
6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:1 
understand or address the unique form of gender oppression that leads an 
individual to such a drastic measure as sex reassignment surgery (SRS).lO 
The fact that Micki' s recovery involved stories of how s/he had been shamed 
and traumatized from the time of his (her) childhood for engaging in gender-
nonconforming behavior did not interest her opponents. Yet I wonder how 
the group never questioned the inclusion of "butchy" lesbians, some of 
whom dressed in very masculine attire, and who described similar childhood 
examples of abusive treatment for their own gender-nonconforming behav-
ior. I have asked and answered my own question: it is all gender-based op-
pression. 
In retrospect, the split-off group's resistance seemed a mere continuation 
of the rigidity based on sex/gender polarization11 which had formed a part of 
Micki's socialization as a malelboy born into this culture-that is, fIrst to 
The sexual/gendered scheme is androsexist both in positing men as superior and women as 
inferior, and by virtue of having evolved in Euro-American law and custom as a so-
cial/public and sexual/private ordering of human relations. Moreover, it is heterosexist in 
privileging heterosexuality over homosexuality. The combination of androsexism and het-
erosexism creates a social system which may be termed hetero-patriarchal. See Francisco 
Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conjlation of "Sex, " 
"Gender, " and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REv. 
1, 36-44 (1995) [hereinafter Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys]. 
Rape, incest (rape within the family), sexual abuse, and sexual harassment serve as 
essential enforcers of a hetero-patriarchal value system which encourages men to believe 
they are superior to women, children, lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgenders. See gen-
erally Rus E. FUNK, STOPPING RAPE: A CHALLENGE FOR MEN 7-56 (1993). In American 
culture, male supremacy and white supremacy work together as interconnected political, 
economic, legal and educational belief systems which maintain white men in superior roles 
over women and people of color. Id.; see also Gloria Anzaldua, Speaking in Tongues: A 
Letter to 3rd World Women Writers, in TillS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY 
RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR 165-73 (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 1983). 
10. Sex reassignment surgery (SRS) is chosen by people who want to conform their 
bodies to a known or felt gender identity which is at odds with the gender identity ascribed 
to them at birth. Information on male-to-female transsexuals is readily available. The lit-
erature on female-to-male transsexualism is small in comparison to both writings on the 
topic of transsexual ism in general or the focus on the male-to-female experience. See Amy 
Bloom, The Body Lies, NEW YORKER, July 18, 1994, at 38, 38-49. It is important to note 
that transgender advocates seek the right to define one's gender identity independent of 
any medical determination of their chromosomal sex, genitalia, assigned birth sex, or ini-
tial gender role. Transgender advocates do not demand a change in one's physically as-
signed sex in order to adopt a transgender identity; rather, they advocate the right to choose 
and receive competent medical and professional care, which may include hormonal therapy 
and partial or full SRS for those persons who desire to create a physical gender identity 
that matches the gender identity they have defined for themselves. See ICTLEP, THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF GENDER RIGHTS (1993) (on file with author). 
11. I define gender polarization or gender bipolarity as a set of values based on the cul-
tural belief that masculinity and femininity are the only conceivable gender roles available 
to males and females born in this culture. American culture is highly gender polarized, in 
contrast to various Native-American and Polynesian cultures which incorporate gender 
fluidity in the socialization patterns of young males and females. See WENDY KESSLER & 
SUZANNE MCKENNA, GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 25 (1979) 
(discussing the history of the Berdache cultures of many Native-American groups). 
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deny and then to channel or re-direct a child's experience of sex/gender dis-
sonance with discipline, judgment and shaming. 12 In the larger picture of 
Euro-American sex/gender socialization patterns, a girl's "tomboyishness" 
seems more easily tolerated, allowing girls and young women to make tran-
sitions into adulthood by more freely exploring their masculinity.13 Mean-
while, boys are rarely encouraged to experiment with anything like the 
"sissy" behavior which is often derogatorily and incorrectly equated with the 
fIrst signs of homosexuality. 14 These cultural familiarities in childraising 
enforce two critical aspects of a hetero-patriarchal value system: a) the view 
that a "normal" correlation between sex, gender identity and gender-typed 
behavior is heterosexual and b) the view that "normal" people engage in 
gender-typed behavior specifIc to the male or female sex with which they 
were born. 15 This same belief system undergirds the contemporary medical 
diagnosis of "gender identity disorder" which currently provides the latest 
medical conceptual framework for pathologizing homosexuality, as well as 
transvestism or transsexualism. 16 Thus, Micki' s struggles arose from the 
12. HOLLY DEVOR, GENDER BLENDING: CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF DUALITY 65, 68-72 
(1989) (case studies reporting mother-daughter conflicts which centered on turning a tom-
boy into a feminine girl by forcing her to wear skirts and dresses against her will); SANDRA 
L. BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON SEXUAL INEQUALITY 106-
11 (1993) (discussing the 1970s flurry of treatment programs offered by doctors to prevent 
the onset of transsexualism in young children by using coercive behavior modification 
against "gender inappropriate" signs (e.g., limp wrists in boys»; KESSLER & MCKENNA, 
supra note 11, at 91-95 (examining the punishment-reward aspects of common social 
learning techniques used by parents to tum their children into "good boys" and "good 
girls"). See also infra note 16. 
13. BEM, supra note 12, at 150 (discussing the widespread social acceptance of women 
who incorporate male clothing, while men face stigmatization for dressing in female at-
tire). 
14. Gender dissonance in early childhood is likely not a predictor of one's acquiring a 
gay or lesbian sexual orientation, although one study of women who had experienced 
strong gender dissonance as young girls showed that a majority of the study group did in-
deed become lesbians. See DEVOR, supra note 12, at 89-105; see also Susan J. Bradley & 
Kenneth 1. Zucker, Gender Identity Disorder and Psychosexual Problems in Children and 
Adolescents, 35 CAN. J. PSYCIDATRY 477 (1990) (arguing that gender identity disorders in 
children are strong precursors to the emergence of transsexual ism and homosexuality). 
15. See Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys, supra note 9. 
16. Although gays and lesbians have consistently lauded the American Psychiatric As-
sociation's declassification of homosexuality as a mental disorder in 1973, they are naive 
in believing that the established psychiatric profession by any means supports the healthy 
development of a gay or lesbian identity. In 1980, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM), the official manual of the psychiatric profession, introduced the 
"new" diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder (GID), providing a new conceptual frame-
work for categorizing homosexuality as a "sickness." The diagnosis in children of GID is 
used to identify gender nonconforming behavior, which becomes the focus of psychiatric 
treatment intended to "prevent" (rather than cure) signs of "pre-homosexuality" and "pre-
transsexualism." See DSM-N, § 302.9 (1994 ed.). In practice, the availability to parents 
of a GID diagnosis and insurance-funded treatments is just another way of engaging in 
abusive conversion or reparative therapy. See Shannon Minter, From Homosexuality to 
Gender Identity Disorder: How Psychiatry Pathologizes Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
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ashes of a painful past, in both personal and societal terms, where a stern 
father harshly reacted to Micki's unconventional interest in "girl things" and 
demanded, with verbal, physical, and sexual abuse, that he "be a man and 
not a sissy." The young Micki had internalized his father's repeated disap-
pointments in his development as a "normal" boy; it was as though he had 
committed a crime by feeling and wanting to do that which was reserved for 
one born into a female body. The sum of painful events-from trying to 
heal her own conflicts with the role she had never fulfilled by being born and 
typed "male," to her presently being labeled "not a 'real woman"'-forced 
Micki to fmd (create) another place to heal from her personal traumas: a 
trans gender support group for individuals whose lives defied the ideology of 
sexual dimorphism and gender polarization. 17 Society had provided the sci-
ence to attempt to heal her past by changing her sexual identity, but it failed 
to provide a supportive environment for living with that new identity amidst 
the various kinds of prejudice Micki might confront, including the kind she 
did in fact face in her first incest survivors' group. 
I have often wondered what would have happened in that group if Micki 
had not left. In the few weeks she was there, did it make any difference for 
someone like Micki, who had been raised as a boy and had become a man, to 
hear the depth of anger experienced by women who had survived male rape 
or incest and who now felt desperate at being unable to escape even a hint of 
residual male energy in a trans gender female? Was it unreasonable for the 
women-from-birth to see Micki as a burden, rather than as someone who 
might help their healing by vouching as a once-man for the reality of abusive 
male power, and affrrming to them, "yes, this is what men do and you were 
unjustly violated?" Could either side have seen the source of their fears and 
their unjust experiences as rooted in societal attitudes based on male power 
and privilege which continue to induce heightened levels of female sexual 
victimization,I8 or which so oppress some boys/men that their only escape is 
to castrate the physical signs of the male gender identity they were assigned 
Transgender Youth 7-8 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Daphne 
Scholinski, I was Never Meant to Survive, NCLR NEWSLETTER (Nat'l Ctr. for Lesbian 
Rights, S.F., Cal.), Spring 1996, at 11. 
17. The sex/gender paradigm of sexual dimorphism is synonymous with the concepts of 
gender bipolarity I introduced in supra note 4. It posits that the division between male and 
female arises from sex differentiated chromosomal typing, levels of hormones, reproduc-
tive systems and mental natures, all of which are assumed to develop "naturally" and pre-
natally. The data supporting the existence of such a neat dimorphic reality in all human 
beings has been severely undermined. See KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra note 11; see gen-
erally MARTINE ROTHBLATT, THE APARTHEID OF SEX (1995). 
18. As discussed briefly in the introduction, the meetings were intended as a kind of 
self-therapy based on 12-step spiritual principles, and not at all a forum for exploring the 
politics of sex. Nevertheless, they produced clear examples of the "parade of horrors" long 
described by feminists as the proof of women's sexual victimization. The meetings also 
induced greater self-empowerment in the women, long deemed a worthy end goal by 
feminists. For a discussion of the latter, see generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 220-21 (1991). 
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at birth? 
II. THE ALLEGED INVASIONS OF LESBIAN SPACE: 
TRANSGENDERISM, RACE, CLASS AND PROGRESSIVE 
POLITICS 
9 
The topic of transgenderism may seem odd for a feminist lesbian 
scholar. Some may question why I choose to focus on the plight of mere 
"not-men" whose dress, demeanor, and behavior sometimes takes on the ap-
pearance of rather conventional-looking women. 19 Although the resistance 
to my academic inquiry on this topic has been quite forceful,20 I am un-
daunted by my critics; this essay is an attempt to refme the basis of my in-
quiry. As a Latina and lesbian scholar interested in exploring the outer 
reaches of gender, sexuality, and race from a feminist perspective, my theo-
retical interest in the plight of the transsexual under current approaches to 
law and the politics of identity (especially at conferences discussing lesbian 
legal theoryl) has been greatly confused with my lobbying on behalf of 
transgenderism. But I see my inquiry as an example of what Ruthann Rob-
son calls the "hard cases," in which theorizing about those who claim the la-
bel "lesbian" forces not only a re-examination of our assumptions about 
what a lesbian is,22 but also forces us to consider how deeply the sense of 
19. My assessments regarding appearance derive strictly from personal interactions over 
the years with a few male-to-female transsexuals, including Micki, and from photographs 
of leading activists whose gender identity switching has included complete role reversal, at 
least with respect to gendered appearances as either a woman or man. Many transsexuals 
reach the point of living like the opposite sex "full time," which means in the full dress 
and regalia of a woman, if they were born and socialized male, and vice-versa, and which 
includes hormonal therapy and readiness for surgery, but which does not necessarily in-
clude taking the final step of SRS. Phyllis R. Frye, Out of the Closet for Fifteen Years and 
Making It In Houston, Texas, 59 TV-TS TAPESTRY J. 65 (1991). Transgender lobbyists 
often dress conservatively, distinctly dressing cross-gendered when they approach legisla-
tors on Capitol Hill. See Randolph Frye, Success on Capitol Hill, THE ICTLEP REp. 
(Houston, Tex.), Nov. 1995-Jan. 1996, at 6 (on file with author). Having attended the Fifth 
Transgender Conference in Houston in July 1996, however, I can no longer generalize on 
the appearance of transgender females or males. Their diversity in physical dress and ap-
pearance abounds. 
20. The resistance I experienced concerning this topic at the Lavender Law Conference 
in October 1994 in Portland, Oregon, was especially interesting in terms of the racial and 
ethnic patterns of the disagreement in the room over whether I had inappropriately invaded 
lesbian space by introducing the subject of transgenderism. I truly wish I did not have to 
sound the voice of criticism (and experience) against the white middle-class lesbian resis-
tance to exploring any level of inclusiveness or interconnected theorizing between issues of 
race, class, sexuality and gender. I discuss this problem more fully below. 
21. See RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT}LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 15-
26 (1992). 
22. Even the phrase, "a lesbian is a woman who says she is," presents interesting conno-
tations when deconstructed, because one assumes the phrase is being uttered by a woman. 
Yet what exactly is a -woman is precisely at issue when one explores the meanings and as-
sumptions we make about sexual identity in discussing transgendered individuals. The 
quote is by Cheryl Clark. Id. at 21. 
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who we are or who others are, or should be, is affected by our living in a 
gendered culture. Although some theorists may disagree with the role of the 
topic or the perspective, I approach the subject of transsexualism, 23 or trans-
genderism, as a feminist and see it as a useful subject to the efforts of les-
bian/gayor feminist legal theorists to deconstruct the impact of male patri-
archy.24 The reactions to someone like Micki also illustrates for me another 
volatile aspect of the social revolution inspired over the past two decades by 
feminism, the movement for gay and lesbian civil rights, and the burgeoning 
politics of identity: the growing demand that theory and politics recognize 
the interconnections not only between sex, gender identiti5 and sexuality, 
but also between race, ethnicity, class, and any of the above categories.26 
Ironically, it was at a panel on lesbian legal theory, where I introduced 
the subject of transgenderism as a vehicle for exploring the outer reaches of 
gender-based discrimination, and was so fiercely questioned for doing so, 
that I witnessed the failure of progressive scholars and lawyers who inveigh 
against the evils of racism, sexism, homophobia and classism to "practice 
what they preach." I was the only lesbian-of-color speaker on a panel called 
"lesbian legal theory." Upon concluding my presentation, in which I ex-
plored trans gender discrimination as a means to examine the parallel think-
ing undergirding antilesbianism, a few members of the audience commented 
that my topic "otTended them," because this was "our panel--for lesbians 
only." I immediately felt a familiar loneliness I have often experienced over 
the past decade as the sole racial/ethnic minority at lesbian/gay events. This 
time, however, it grew out of my belief in the need and right of a scholar 
who incorporates the personal narrative into her teaching and scholarship to 
think, write, and speak inclusively on issues of discrimination. 27 I suddenly 
felt like an "outsider" having to justify my project before a quickly growing 
collective of angry white middle-class lesbians who had seemingly never 
traveled between the multiple worlds of class/race/gender/sexual orientation, 
23. Transsexuals are those who use SRS to conform their bodies to their felt gender 
identity. Transgenders, on the other hand, include transsexuals as well as people who will 
never choose any form of transsexual ism, hormonal or surgical, to express their noncon-
forming gender identity. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
24. See ROBSON, supra note 21, at 19-22 (arguing against the view that lesbian legal 
theory should be equated with the efforts of feminist or queer legal theorists, but at the 
same time recognizing that the effort to develop a lesbian legal theory confronts the "rule 
of law," or "rule by men," a common and essential basis of feminist and queer theorizing). 
25. Katherine Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggre-
gation o/Sex/rom Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1995); see also Elvia R. Arriola, Gen-
dered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays and Feminist Legal Theory, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 
103 (1994). 
26. See, e.g., Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys, supra note 9, at 359. 
27. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW 
PROFESSOR 92-94 (1991) (discussing the risks of teaching or writing with a personal style 
and the "kowtow[ing]" to power accomplished by academic writing which negates feelings 
and experience). 
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or who simply lived their lives blithely assuming that everyone's experiences 
as a lesbian are (or should be) exactly like their own. 
The rejection of my topic appeared as an indirect effort to exclude the 
interests of anyone who was not a "real lesbian,,,28 and to ensure that the 
theorizing be confmed to "real lesbian legal theory." From either perspec-
tive, I cannot help but view such reactions as nurturing a belief very damag-
ing for these times--the idea that our various "progressive" movements are 
(and should be) disconnected from each other. If these are the premises that 
underlie the politics of identity, then the legacy of our activism is nothing but 
divisiveness. If divisiveness underlies our activism, whether as progressive 
lawyers or scholars, should we be surprised by the reinforcement of such 
thinking in the legal system? Is it any surprise that the courts continue to 
divide and categorize, putting limits, for example, on interpreting statutory 
terms like "sex" to cover antigay prejudice,29 or on acknowledging 
"intersectional" claims of discrimination (e.g., racist sexism)?3o Has the op-
pressor in fact conquered us by dividing us? 
How then does theorizing about intersectionality or about the failures of 
an inclusive politics of identity become relevant to heated debates over a 
"not-man" showing up in an all-women space or seemingly appropriating the 
"lesbian" identity label? My concern here is to identify how and why we 
create the boundaries for social categories (e.g., race, sex, class) when we 
28. The resistant audience members had as much trouble with this Latina lesbian 
speaking on the subject of transgenderism as with the presence of a Latino gay man, Pro-
fessor Frank Valdes, who argued for interconnectivity between queer and lesbian legal 
theories. Valdes' experience is discussed in his essay, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Cul-
ture: Ruminations on Identities and Inter-Connectivities, 5 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's 
Stud. 25, 36-38 (1995). 
29. See, e.g., Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (rejecting a claim 
of sexual harassment by a sexually shy and unmarried man living with his mother against 
male co-workers on grounds that the conduct at issue was not intended to be covered by 
the term "sex" in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); De Santis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 608 
F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting claim that Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimi-
nation extends to include homosexuality); see also Underwood v. Archer Management 
Serv., 857 F. Supp. 96 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (disallowing claim for firing because of trans-
sexuality under Title VII's prohibition against sex-based discrimination); compare 
Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 4th 1409 (1993) (allowing claim for same-sex 
harassment between men under California law). 
30. The theory of intersectionality or mUltiple intersectionality asserts that some indi-
viduals' legal claims of discrimination should be defined by more than a singular charac-
teristic (e.g., race, sexuality), and that courts should allow for the introduction of evidence 
which validates that particular identity (e.g., Black woman) whose experience of discrimi-
nation embodies a more complex and interdependent functioning of factors (e.g., racist 
sexism or homophobic racism). Legal theorists need to explore ways of recognizing the 
"compound claim of discrimination" which may address the issues of exclusion and injus-
tice raised by the intersectional identity. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, 
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 139. See generally Marga-
ret Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas y Grefias: Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding: 
Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 CmcANoL. REv. 1 (1994). 
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also know that their defmitions and their usefulness depend not only upon 
social and self-constructions but also on the potential interrelationship of 
singular factors with one or more other factors. As Frank Valdes has re-
cently argued, progressive theorizing has reached a point where scholars 
need to confront the full meaning of intersectionality and begin to practice a 
theory and politics of "interconnectivity" between the movements we know 
as race/crit, femlcrit or queer theory.3l I would enhance Valdes' theory of 
interconnectivity by arguing that if one of the goals of the politics of identity 
is to promote nondiscrimination, then the representatives of such a political 
agenda or activism should be guided by an ethics of inclusion. For I am 
continually puzzled by the rhetoric of supposed advocates against racism, 
sexism, or homophobia who overwhelmingly emphasize an exclusivity which 
appears fear-based, self-centered, and discriminatory. In the same way that 
feminist scholars were charged with exclusion and insensitivity because they 
neglected the cause of lesbians and women of color, it is patently inconsis-
tent for feminist, lesbian/gay, or queer legal theorists not to explore the outer 
reaches of gender nonconformism, as illustrated by the transgendered victim 
of violence and discrimination. 32 Exclusionary tactics in progressive activ-
ism, which induce exclusive theorizing, cannot possibly create a world 
which tolerates difference and diversity, whether based on sex, gender, race, 
creed, sexuality, national origin, class, age, or physical ability. 33 Theorists 
like Adrienne Rich34 and bell hooks35 similarly argued that the struggle of 
feminists to deconstruct patriarchal power could not be separated from the 
struggle against homophobia and racism. Thus, for example, when a major 
women's organization would rather fight inclusion, under the banner of 
feminist idealism, than risk the discomfort of working against exclusion and 
for coalition, its members give value to discrimination.36 
31. See Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys, supra note 9, at 372. 
32. In some countries, including the U.S., the level of human rights abuses oftransgen-
dered and gay or lesbian individuals has reached a level of psychological terrorism which 
induces depression and suicide. These are formidable hurdles which a few women and 
men have survived and documented. See Human Rights Violations Based on Gender 
Identity and Sexual Orientation, in THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS AGAINST SEXUAL MINORITIES 18-23 (Oct. 17, 1995) (on file with author). 
33. See Arriola, supra note 25. 
34. ADRIENNE RICH, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in BLOOD, 
BREAD, AND POETRY, SELECTED PROSE: 1979-1985 23-75 (1986). 
35. See BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO THE CENTER 67-81 (1984). 
36. The second example of exclusionary reactions to transsexual females which I wit-
nessed occurred in the summer of 1993. when I attended the internationally renowned 
Michigan Womyn's Music Festival and became aware that a group of separatist lesbians 
had threatened the "men" with physical violence if they tried to camp on the grounds with 
the thousands of women "legitimately" born into female bodies. As campers exited the 
Festival grounds, they were greeted by transsexual females who had camped outside the 
gates and displayed their placards in protest of the Festival policy. For a news account, see 
Barbara Brotman, A Utopian World for Women Only: The Michigan Womyn's Music Fes-
tival Draws Thousands to Celebrate All that is Female, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 26, 1993, at 
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III. THE POTENTIAL FOR DIVISIVENESS IN THE POLITICS 
OF IDENTITY 
Those feminists or lesbians who would resist including a trans gender 
female in their group value discrimination by making the possessiveness and 
control of the labels and categories by which people can be described (e.g., 
lesbian) more important than the potentially deconstructive role these labels 
play in helping describe the multiple aspects of a single personal identity 
(e.g., religion, race, sexuality, age, gender, etc.). I imagine many of us feel 
in our gut that our personal identities unite an infmite number of social, en-
vironmental and physical traits, none ever singularly describing "who I 
really am." Yet the urge to hinge an identity on the basis of a single factor is 
strong. 37 After all, identity politics provide one with a sense of membership 
in a community with others who validate our membership in a chosen group 
identity. But because everyone's identity reflects a convergence of factors, 
the potential for multiple group identities is also present in everyone. On the 
same day that I identify as lesbian and feel validated in my attending a les-
bian dance, I might also attend an AA meeting and know that most of its at-
tendees will not also go to the lesbian dance, but instead will reflect a wide 
cross-section of the non-lesbian or gay community of the town in which I 
live. Similarly, when I attend a social event in which, through ritual, music, 
language or foods, I celebrate my being Latina, the lesbian and AA-member 
aspects of my identity are greatly submerged and in tension with my gen-
dered role in Latino culture. Yet each of those criteria, and many others I 
use to describe my identity, are strong and important to the defmition of 
"who I really am." Each alone does not condition my need or right to be a 
member of the other group identity. The choice is ultimately mine, because 
the sense of my identifying with the particular group is largely based on my 
personal experience with the community. Also, the criteria for membership 
is usually very easily met-stating that I am a lesbian (and am familiar with 
and respect the lifestyle and identity of lesbians in my community)38 or I am 
a recovering alcoholic (and am familiar with the conditions of being in a 
support group for people who wish to live their lives sober from alcohol and 
drugs). 
Nonetheless, the urge to attach the significance of social power or even 
legal categorization to a single factor is tempting, especially since the poli-
Tempo 1. 
37. See, e.g., ROBSON, supra note 21, at 15-26. 
38. The policing of identities is not unfamiliar to the lesbian community. In the seven-
ties, the femme look in hair, jewelry, facial make-up and dress were grounds for doubting 
someone's true lesbian identity, because of both the feminist lesbian emphasis on a politi-
cally correct androgynous and declassed look and appearance, and the disdain for any 
semblance of the old butch/femme roles. See LILLIAN F ADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND 
TWILIGHT LoVERS: A HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE IN TwENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 230-31 
(1991 ). 
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tics of identity can sometimes affect important legal battles involving unfair 
discrimination (e.g., Colorado's Amendment 2).39 But it is also true that the 
law is slow to recognize that people's identities do not come in neat singular 
categories. Rather, many people live at the margins of complex and am-
biguous identities, experiencing the intersection of familiar categories like 
"Black," "female," or "lesbian," or even "woman.',4() Thus I return to the 
story of Micki who, having lived "as a woman" for fifteen years, certainly 
presented an ambiguous identity, and felt she belonged in a women's support 
group not only because she felt female and lesbian, but also because she 
needed a safe space where she could talk about the sexual abuse slbe experi-
enced at the hands of her Ibis father when slbe was a boy. 
This confiict--1)ver who gets to self-identify as "woman," or "lesbian," 
or "Black," or whatever-must be seriously questioned. Allowed to exist, it 
will hamper our progressive idealism by accepting the male-dominated cul-
tural belief that the only path to a liberated world is one which uses the 
male-defmed categories, labels and paradigms which have defmed our iden-
tities and our places in the old power structure. That is a belief system 
which also creates hierarchies and relationships of power between various 
categories and labels. That belief system, created to maintain men and An-
glo-European whites in power, unfortunately also portrays human beings as 
being unable to change their minds or their paradigms about gender and sex, 
or about race or sexuality. It prevents us from considering more visionary 
paradigms where sexual (or racial) identity reaches far beyond the limited 
dimorphism of male/female, heterosexuallhomosexual, or whitelblack cate-
gories. 
The experience of trans gender females who have been kicked out of 
more public41 feminist and lesbian-inspired "womanspaces,,42 illustrates how 
easily we internalize the values of a white male and heterosexist culture 
which teaches competition, domination, control, and fear of "The Other." 
Our first instinct is to align with our oppressors' values and to exclude those 
who differ from us, rather than to include them in our cause. Unconscious 
of our internalized fears, we perpetuate beliefs which allow sex, gender, 
race, and class to become the strongest tools for dividing and weakening 
39. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, __ U.S. -' 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1621-22 (1996) 
(striking down as unconstitutional a Colorado law which would prohibit all legislative, 
executive, and/or judicial action designed to protect lesbians and gays from discrimina-
tion). See also Elvia R. Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution: Homosexual Per-
sons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 263 (1992). 
40. See Mary Coombs, Interrogating Identity. 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 221 (1996) 
(reviewing JUDY SCALEs-TRENT, WillTE BLACK WOMAN: RACE, COLOR, COMMUNITY 
(1995). 
41. See supra notes 7 and 36 (discussion of the difference between the rejection of 
transgender females by a support group versus their rejection by the organizers and par-
ticipants ofa public event like the Michigan Womyn's Festival). 
42. See supra notes 3 and 7. 
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those who are already oppressed. Acting from that unconscious fear and 
prejudice, we then rally, in theory, for a progressivism which too often turns 
into an exercise of jealously guarding "our own special cause" (e.g., lesbi-
ans, women, Blacks, chicanos) and resisting coalition with "those others" 
whose situation cannot be envisioned as a reflection of ourselves. 
Some may argue that I greatly misunderstand the well-meant effort to 
oust an ambiguous identity like Micki' s in order to preserve the empowering 
atmosphere of a womanspace. On a social and political level, the need by 
some women generally (using an appeal to feminism) and by some lesbians 
to reject the male-to-female transsexual (MTF) strikes me as based purely 
on the fear that including a not-woman/former man in womenspaces affects 
a loss for women. The argument made is appealing. As it is stated: a man 
without a penis, even one with the massive dosages of estrogen hormones 
required to soften the body,43 to make it "womanish," does not rid that indi-
vidual of the socialization patterns ingrained from the time of birth. Thus, 
the not-man, though appearing female, and even possibly having been 
around female energy throughout "his" life, has experienced childhood and 
adult life as a boy/man. The source of the distrust and fear can of course be 
supported by the social reality that, generally, men are different from 
women--less sensitive, stronger, more aggressive and competitive, less 
nurturing, etc. (Of course, these always remain no more than gross gener-
alizations about people's identities.) Therefore, as a former man, "the slhe" 
could never identify with women's issues or their fears regarding acquain-
tance and date or stranger rape. The s/he may experience discrimination as 
a trans gender, of being treated as a freak, but does not know the deeply in-
grained messages that encourage girls and women from birth to be subservi-
ent, nurturing, more feelings-oriented, and obsessed with the need to be 
sexually appealing to men. Instead, as a once-man, the s/he is more com-
fortable with a personal identity that fIrst knew the privilege of being pre-
sumed more intelligent, better able, worthy, individualistic, and emotionally 
stable, just for having been born with a penis. Arguably, as a once-man, the 
s/he has a personality which will always draw upon the experiences of 
someone who had and felt the power of being male. Thus (according to this 
argument), despite the hormones, the cross-dressing, and the SRS, a trans-
sexual female will never be a woman, but will always be a former man, at 
best an in-between woman who barely "passes" as female. Other feminists 
argue that supporting MTFs who claim they are "trapped" in men's bodies 
is akin to supporting the offensive conformity to sex-role stereotyping.44 
43. Estrogen therapy is designed to achieve partial castration and hormonal feminiza-
tion, results which do not last without long-term treatment intended to achieve testicular 
atrophy and gynecomastia. Hormonal therapy is not permanent. HARRY BENJAMIN, THE 
TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON 92-93 (1966); see also ROBERT 1. STOLLER, PRESENTATIONS OF 
GENDER 152-70 (1985). 
44. This statement depends upon the unfortunate stereotyping of all people who struggle 
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Rather than standing behind the MTFs' notion of "woman," they claim these 
men need consciousness-raising, not surgery.45 
Despite the long list of reasons for distrusting the motives of the male-
to-female transsexual, I wonder whether there isn't another connection be-
tween the need of some straight women and lesbians to exclude all MTF 
transsexuals as former "men" and the unconscious need to believe in bio-
logical essentialism.46 Does an individual's socialization as either a man or 
woman stop at a point of no return, such that even the most sincere candi-
date for undoing his "maleness," for trying to understand woman's pain, can 
never be trusted in support groups or in all-womanspaces like the Michigan 
W omyn' s F estival47 because of lingering effects of the testosterone in his 
blood and the socialization of his youth? Formally and rationally excluded 
from the support groups "because they've never known women's pain," the 
s/he is stigmatized for having had a penis and enjoying (or enduring) the 
privileges of being socialized as a male. 
By never giving the not-man an opportunity to learn or understand 
women's pain, feminist activism on behalf of women appears narrow-
focusing only on getting angry for the victimization-and avoids any situa-
tion which may force creativity in the search for a liberated human politics.48 
I question whether anger should be seen as the only option for healing from 
with their assigned gender identity as feeling "trapped" in a man or woman's body. The 
transgenderist culture is rather diverse in its quest for acceptance in a gender bipolar soci-
ety; many seek a peaceable manner of expressing gender ambiguity, some of which may 
include hormonal therapy and cross-dressing while making the final step of SRS an op-
tional feature. KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW 121 (1995). Martine Rothblatt force-
fully argues that "[m]anhood and womanhood can be life-style choices open to anyone, re-
gardless of genitalia. It is law and custom, not biology that makes birth order, birth 
parents, skin tone, or genitals relevant to one's ability to choose a culture, perform a job, 
or adopt a life-style. Liberated from legal constraints and archaic stereotypes, our social 
identity can flow from our soul and our experiences, not from our anatomy and our birth 
status." ROTHBLATT, supra note 17, at 3-4. 
45. Claudia Card, Intimacy and Responsibility: What Lesbians Do, in AT THE 
BOUNDARIES OF THE LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 77, 86 (Martha A. Fineman & 
Nancy S. Thomadsen eds., 1991). 
46. The appearance of feminist discourse in the 1980s arguably displaying a biological 
essentialist tone was a response to 1960s and '70s feminist rhetoric casting women's op-
pression in either victimizing or falsely neutral terms. Works like Carol Gilligan's In A 
Different Voice (1982) tried to explore the danger of making women's traits and qualities 
invisible, but in doing so fired off an internal equality versus difference debate in which 
the feminist differences approach, despite its efforts to celebrate women's positive traits, 
has been charged as giving rebirth to beliefs grounded in gender polarization and nine-
teenth century concepts of the biologically determined destiny of men's and women's 
identities. 
47. See supra notes 7 and 36. 
48. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. 
REv. 581,612 (1990) (arguing against feminist essentialist definitions of woman as victim, 
which nurture images of ourselves as passive, acted-upon individuals who are unable to 
shape our own lives through creative action). 
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the victim role growing out of gender oppression. 49 I question whether 
treating a s/he with a biological essentialist attitude, premised on some un-
articulated belief in sexual dimorphism, doesn't perpetuate the hetero-
patriarchal values which created the gender roles of the "privileged male" 
and "subordinate female" in the first place. 50 Although quite plainly peo-
ple's sex and gender identities are not and have never been "either/or,,,51 the 
failure to deconstruct the conflation of sex and gender (or sexual orientation) 
perpetuates the paradigms of androcentrism52 and heterosexism53 which in 
turn feed homophobia and transphobia.54 
IV. THE IMPACT OF SEX/GENDER BIPOLAR THINKING: 
FINDING THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN FEMINISM, 
HOMOPHOBIA AND TRANSGENDERISM 
On a broader level, I wonder if the deep distrust in the outcome of gen-
der identity switching rests in the pervasiveness of a gender value system 
which equally supports sexism, homophobia and transphobia by enforcing 
the belief in sexual dimorphism or gender polarization. This sex/gender 
ideology conditions people to see an unbroken link from physical sex at birth 
to gender status, to gender role, to a totalistic, all-encompassing sex-
determined social structure. All human situations are then governed by an 
ideology in which sex/gender bipolarity,55 or a binary matrix of male/female 
49. See generally MARIANNE WILLIAMSON, A WOMAN'S WORTH (1993) (an appeal to the 
modem woman that she reflect on the strength and survival aspects of her gender identity, 
in working towards self-empowennent and personal growth). 
50. See generally Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys, supra note 9. 
51. The historical data abounds with examples of sex and gender nonconformists for 
whom SRS was not an option, and whose way of defying contemporary sex and gender 
nonns could not be easily categorized under what we call today "lesbian" or "gay." See 
generally JONATHANN. KATZ, GAy/LESBIAN ALMANAC (1983). 
52. Androcentrism is the ideological foundation of male patriarchy. It is a view of the 
human scheme as being not only gendered (male/female, man/woman, mascu-
line/feminine), but also as male dominated. Androcentrism simply posits that men are 
dominant and women are subordinate. fu an androcentric culture, the underlying assump-
tion is that what is important is male, what is trivial is female; what is positive is male, 
what is negative is female; what is powerful is male, what is weak is female; man is 
autonomous while woman is relative. Androcentrism serves as the basis for a sociological 
theory of sexual inequality which illustrates the various ways in which the man always sur-
faces as the subject and the absolute, while the woman always emerges as the unimportant 
appendage or "the other." See BEM, supra note 12, at 39-79. 
53. See supra note 9. 
54. Transphobia is the groundless fear and hatred of cross-dressers, transsexuals, and 
gender benders. INVESTIGATION INTo DISCRIMINATION AGAINST TRANSGENDERED PEOPLE: 
REPORT OF THE HUMAN RIGmS COMMISSION OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 66 
(1994). 
55. Gender theorist Holly Devor defines the framework of gender polarization (which I 
also call gender bipolarity or sexual dimorphism) as a belief system shared by most mem-
bers of society which asserts that 
there are two and only two sexes (female and male); that every person, 
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and masculine/feminine, dictates how people should see others, how they 
should see themselves, and how to give themselves and others gendered cues 
of appropriate behavior. An ingrained belief that all human beings exist 
only within the framework of sexual dimorphism or gender polarization 
manifests itself in the social conviction that no one can (or should) ever de-
part from the roles and cues which accompany each sex/gender. An exclu-
sionist reaction to the MTF transsexual obviously illustrates the pervasive-
ness of this gender-bipolar belief system. For no matter how an individual 
might change herlhis gender identity,56 whether through behavior and attire, 
or through hormones and surgery, or even the consciousness-raising of a 
women's support group, the transition is viewed as untrustworthy and unac-
ceptable. 
Reflected in this resistance must be some deep commitment to biological 
essentialism, for alternative paradigms in which gender and/or sexual iden-
tity are viewed as byproducts of our belief systems and of everyday social 
construction consistently recede into the background. 57 A commitment to 
biological essentialism, conscious or not, must not be used to justify the 
continued oppression of individuals for whom sex and gender identities, like 
race/ethnicity, are continuous and not bipolar. Yet one could characterize 
the resistance by feminists and the gay and lesbian community to including 
most animals, and many things must be either one or the other; and that one 
cannot be both male and female, cannot be neither male nor female, and 
cannot change sex without the aid of surgery. Concomitant with this is the 
belief that there are two and only two genders (girls/women and boys/men), 
and that whatever a woman does will somehow have the stamp of feminin-
ity on it, while whatever a man does will likewise bear the imprint of mas-
culinity. 
DEVOR, supra note 12, at vii. 
56. The ideology I call gender bipolarity or sexual dimorphism is comprised of other 
relevant concepts: 1) gender assignment, the special case of gender attribution imposed by 
society through doctors and midwives at the time of birth; 2) gender identity, which is the 
self-attribution of a gender (e.g., I am a woman); 3) gender role, which is the set of expec-
tations about behaviors deemed appropriate for people of one gender (e.g., women wear 
facial make-up); 4) masculine, which designates the expression of culturally approved at-
tire and conduct for males; 5) feminine, which is the expression of culturally approved at-
tire and conduct for females; and 6) effeminate, a term often used to designate men who 
caricature stereotyped images of feminine behavior (although even men who do not intend 
to caricature are nonetheless thus labeled). KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra note 11, at 8-18. 
As noted earlier, gender dissonance is a departure from the norms of gender bipolarity. 
See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
57. One of the most careful and nuanced studies making the argument that our cultural 
beliefs and "scientific evidence" supporting the fixed duality of the human body are all 
socially constructed remains Wendy Kessler and Suzanne McKenna, Gender: An Eth-
nomethodological Approach (1978). Martine Rothblatt argues for a radical view of sex 
and sexual identity as existing on a continuum allowing each person to develop a unique 
sexuality. She refers to this as "unisexuality," a non-bipolar sexual world would have to 
rid itself of terms like heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual, which are based on the ei-
ther/or framework for defining body types and sexual partner choices. See ROTHBLATT, 
supra note 1 7, at 140-48. 
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transgenders in their causes as resting on a kind of essentialism about sex 
and gender. While feminists have successfully questioned the use of 
"woman's nature" to justify various social and economic inequities, they 
have insufficiently questioned the relationship between the beliefs we have 
about gender and the beliefs we have about sex. Instead, societal and scien-
tific notions about physical sex, as existing only in a dimorphic framework, 
remain largely unchallenged. 58 We unquestionably accept that there are only 
two sexes. Thus government is afforded the power to differentiate on the 
basis of sex in allocating rights and duties (e.g., exclusion of women from 
ground combat59), maintaining social order (e.g., ordinances banning cross-
dressing60), and identifying members of society (e.g., census). But we fail to 
challenge whether there are truly only "two sexes,,,61 whether such divisions 
do indeed serve society, and whether it isn't time to question the belief in a 
genetic basis for sexual identity. 
The basis of the cultural need to perceive and/or discriminate against 
someone for their failure to conform to the governing sex/ gender rules com-
prises at least eight different elements: 
1) there are two, and only two, sexes/genders (female and male); 
2) one's sex/gender is invariant (if you are female/male, you always 
were female/male, and you will always will be female/male); 
3) genitals are the essential sign of sex/gender (a female is a person 
with a vagina; a male is a person with a penis); 
4) any exceptions to two sexes/genders are not to be taken seriously; 
5) there are no transfers from one sex/ gender to another without 
masquerade; 
6) everyone must be classified as a member of one sex/gender or 
58. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 18 (providing a forceful analysis of male oppres-
sion and female victimization, while merely accepting the paradigm of the world being di-
vided into two sexes and two genders). 
59. Women in Combat: Hearing Before the Military Forces and Personnel Subcomm. 
of the House of Representatives Comm. on Armed Services, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
60. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 192-8, cited in City of Chicago v. Wilson, 
389 N.E.2d 522, 523 (Ill. 1978). 
61. Consider intersexuality, for instance. The transgender movement defines intersexed 
individuals as those who have successfully crossed the sex and gender boundaries through 
SRS or people who have been born with the signs of two sexes (traditionally known as 
"hermaphrodites") and who chose to live as one gender without ever having the signs of 
the other physical sex surgically removed. Natalie Angier, Hermaphrodites Struggle to 
Find Identity in Bodies with Ambiguous Genitalia; Newly Formed Group Prefers to be 
Known as Intersexuals, OrrAWACITIZEN, Feb. 4,1996, at D8. 
20 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:1 
another (there are no cases where sex/gender is not attributed); 
7) the male/female dichotomy is a "natural" one (males and females 
exist independently of scientists' or anyone else's criteria for being 
male or female); and 
8) membership in one sex/gender or another is "natural," (one's be-
ing female or male is not dependent on anyone's deciding who you 
are).62 
The above sex/gender rules infuse the belief system of a hetero-
patriarchal culture. Scholars like Frank Valdes have forcefully argued that 
hetero-patriarchy as a belief system depends upon the conflation or confu-
sion of physical sex with gender. The confusion is compounded further by 
society's tendency to equate sexual conduct with sexual orientation. The 
latter are also conflated with sex and gender. Together, the blurred mean-
ings of these terms-sex, gender, and sexual orientation-sustain a belief 
system in which one's physical sex determines gender, gender determines the 
social dimension of sex, and sexual orientation is the sexual dimension of 
gender. 63 In practice, the conflation of sex, gender and sexual orientation-
which themselves depend upon the belief in sexual dimorphism and gender 
bipolarity--induces powerful cultural attitudes about the relationship be-
tween human beings. Another example of the societal confusion that stems 
from the premises of sexual dimorphism and gender bipolarity has been 
called the "disaggregation" of sex, gender and sexual orientation.64 Either 
view of how society tends to interpret the relationship between sex, gender 
and sexual orientation produces a distorted logic which sustains the sexual 
dimorphic framework I described above. 
It is a logic which fmds full support in the law and medical sciences. 
For example, courts might acknowledge that people can change the outward 
appearance of their physical sex and might even allow a name-change to 
match a new identity,65 but they often resist changing the official designation 
of one's sex on a birth certificate.66 Yet, in a case illustrating the absolute 
62. KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra note 11, at 113-14 (summarizing the views of HAROLD 
GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 122-28 (1967)). 
63. Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys, supra note 9, at 20-33. 
64. See Franke, supra note 25, at 1-2 (defining disaggregation as the failure of courts to 
recognize the relationship between the concepts "sex" and "gender" by arbitrarily separat-
ing their meanings from each other in ways which perpetuate rather than undermine sex 
discrimination). 
65. The common law view of name -changing has usually been to allow it as long as the 
person bears no intent to defraud or interfere with the rights of third parties. See In re 
Anonymous, 314 N.Y.S.2d 668,668 (Civ. Ct. 1970) (allowing name change for transsex-
ual who appeared female after SRS). 
66. Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N. Y.2d 319, 323 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (holding that separa-
tion of powers prevents court from compelling city health department to change sex desig-
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conflation of sex with gender, a court acknowledged a sex -change operation 
(and upheld an allegedly fraudulent marriage) only because the wife "walked 
and talked like a woman," and physically, her new vagina resembled that of 
a "real woman. ,,67 Courts rely on conflated and disaggregated thinking when 
they reject claims of same-sex harassment because, they argue, sexual orien-
tation has nothing to do with sex or gender,68 or they assume that the only 
victims of sexual harassment are women harassed by men. 69 In a similar 
fashion, conflated thinking explains the case of the gay man who was fIred 
for wearing an earring but could not claim sex-based discrimination-in 
spite of the fact that he had transgressed gender rules by flouting the rule of 
virility for men/males by appropriating the effeminate trappings ascribed to 
women/females.70 The same sex/gender logic frowns upon a mother seeking 
custody of a child because she has defied heterosexist norms of sexual be-
havior by engaging in active lesbianism.7l 
The need to enforce the rigid belief in only two sexes and genders has 
similar support in the medical sciences. For example, parents today may 
seek medical treatment for a boy child who displays "pre-sissy" behavior, 
such as excessive cross-dressing with jewelry and dresses, or playing with 
girls' toys (and vice-versa for girls), or otherwise shows the early signs of 
homosexuality, transvestism or transsexualism.72 
The judicial aversion to the exploration of a different gender identity 
from that assigned at birth is firm. When, after an extended leave, Kenneth 
Ulane returned to work as Karen Ulane, she was fired and unable to sue her 
employer United Airlines (UA) for sex discrimination. 73 Both the court and 
UA conflated Karen's birth sex with her gender (once born "male" then al-
ways a "man,,).74 Of course, the court was also guilty of disaggregated 
thinking when it separated out the question of disapproval for acquiring a 
female identity from the legal notion of sex-based discrimination for men 
nation on postoperative MTF transsexual's birth certificate); see also Anonymous v. Mel-
lon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99, 103 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (upholding city health department's refusal to 
either show sex on postoperative MTF transsexual's birth certificate as "female" or to 
show original sex as male and present sex as female). 
67. M.T. v. IT., 355 A.2d 204, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
68. See Dillon v. Frank, 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that male plaintiff 
taunted and ostracized by co-workers who believed he was homosexual had no claim for 
sexual harassment under Title VII); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 
F.3d 1191, 1195-96 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that male plaintiff's alleged harassers were 
heterosexual and therefore the harassment was not "because of sex"). 
69. See De Santis v. Pacific Tel. and Tel., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979). 
70. Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery Sch., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 328, 333 (9th Cir. 1979). 
71. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108-09 (Va. 1995) (denying custody to lesbian 
mother and ruling that although lesbians are not per se unfit parents, sexual orientation is 
an "important consideration"). 
72. See Max Sugar, A Clinical Approach to Childhood Gender Identity Disorder, 49 
AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 260,270-81 (1995). 
73. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081,1087 (7th Cir. 1984). 
74. Id. at 1087. 
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who depart from their assigned sex/ gender identities and roles. It could not 
accept the possibility that one's gender identity or sexual identity might not 
have a genetic basis at all. The result was a convoluted ruling holding that 
Karen had no claim for the unprotected category of transsexualism because 
such a claim bore no relationship to Kenneth's originally ascribed sex and 
gender identity. 75 
Individuals who do not conform to the heterosexist normative principles 
of sex/gender bipolarity do suffer "sex-based discrimination" for their gen-
dered non-conformism to the social limits placed on their biological sex, 
whether it be in the workplace,76 family life77 or love relationships.78 The 
impact of such an all-encompassing framework of beliefs about sex and 
gender is vast. People who depart from their assigned sex and gender iden-
tities,79 roles, cues, and values experience discrimination because they un-
75. Id.; see also James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 478 (D. Kan. 1995) 
(dismissing Title VII claim by transsexual who was fired because she wanted to begin re-
porting to work as a female). 
76. See Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that sexual harassment between men is not gender discrimination). In terms of the 
social limits imposed through stigmatization on sexual/gender transgressive men who 
willingly give up their phallocentric/masculine/male identity, the classic examples include 
the courts' refusal to recognize discrimination against transsexuals. See Ulane, 742 F.2d 
1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Dobre v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 288 
(E.D. Pa. 1993). They also include lawmakers' explicit denial of protection or coverage, 
in federal laws prohibiting disability-based discrimination, to any medical needs and/or 
discrimination associated with non-heterosexual identities. See Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990 § 511, 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (1995); Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 7, 29 
U.S.C. § 706(8)(E)-(F) (1995) (creating exclusions for, inter alia, homosexuality, bi-
sexuality, transvestism, transsexuals, and gender identity disorders). Compare Price Wa-
terhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that discrimination against female 
partner candidate for her "macho" demeanor is sex-based discrimination). 
77. See, e.g., Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1992) (ruling that lesbian 
mother not entitled to custody of child because she flaunted her homosexuality); S.E.G. v. 
R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (granting primary custody to divorced hus-
band on grounds that public exposure of lesbianism will effectuate harm on the child). 
78. See, e.g., In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio P. Ct. 1987) (refusing to grant mar-
riage license to MTF transsexual); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 
1971) (nullifying marriage between males, notwithstanding that "husband" believed 
"wife" was a female at time of ceremony and that "she" became subsequently female 
through SRS); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. 1974), reh 'g denied, 84 Wash. 
2d 1008 (1974) (denying marriage license to gay couple). Compare Baehr v. Lewin, 852 
P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that denial of marriage to same-sex couples may violate 
Hawaii Constitution's prohibition against sex-based discrimination. On remand, the trial 
court found that the denial was indeed sex-based discrimination. Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 
91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996). The state has appealed.). 
79. The medical establishment is very committed to gender polarization (i.e., hetero-
sexuality as the norm). The true transsexual is presumed to want a sexual orientation 
which will accommodate the new gender. Thus a MTF transsexual should want sex with 
men, and a FTM transsexual should desire sex with women. KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra 
note 11, at 118. Doctors are known to pressure married candidates for a sex change to 
seek divorce from their spouses, a practice which is opposed by transgender activists. See 
Health Law Standards of Care for Transsexualism, THE ICTLEP REp. (Houston, Tex.), 
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dermine the notions of biology which thoroughly infuse the dominant gender 
scheme. In that scheme, "normalcy" becomes a rigid set of gender identities 
and roles for the female/male sexed body. Discounting the reality of people 
born with ambiguously sexed bodies,80 the bipolar gendered ideology up-
holds the image of the masculine "real man" and the feminine "real woman." 
Departures from the gendered norms become the stuff of social and legal 
discriminations: two women in a relationship being discouraged from serv-
ing as committed parents to an adoptive child,81 two men or two women not 
being able to marry in most states,82 a surgical female not being able to 
marry a man,83 openly gay or lesbian soldiers not being able to serve in the 
military,84 effeminate men being freely sexually harassed by macho men, 85 
and so on. It is in this sense that the discrimination arising from one's fail-
ure to conform to society'S basic rules of sex and gender must be viewed as 
nothing but sex- or gender-based discrimination.86 Individuals who depart 
from those norms, whether willfully or not, are therefore "transgendered," or 
Aug. 1993 ("If the patient is married, the surgeon may not require divorce but may require 
the spouse to sign a waiver of liability form.") (on file with author). Notably, if an al-
ready-married, heterosexual candidate for a sex change refuses to get a divorce after the 
surgery, and the wifelhusband stays in the relationship, these individuals would subse-
quently be in a legally valid same-sex marriage! This adds an ironic twist to the debate on 
same-sex marriage generated by passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), which grew out of the conservative reaction to the 
Baehr decision, 852 P .2d 44. 
80. This essay does not explore intersexuality, although it is stilI widely documented in 
significant numbers. The medical establishment has dealt with this and other forms of 
sexual ambiguity at birth by encouraging parents to choose a gender identity for the child 
which is then anatomically "corrected" to fit the choice. See JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF 
THE BODY AND RELATED SYNDROMES: A GUIDE TO COUNSELING CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS, 
AND THEIR FAMILIES 6 (1994). A study of twin intersexuals who were assigned different 
genders before they were four years old, who then successfully became a "boy" and "girl," 
is often relied upon to argue that biology plays a very limited role in contributing to the 
development of a particular gender identity. See KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra note 11, at 
68-72. 
81. In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A2d 21 (N.H. 1987) (opining that a law forbid-
ding the adoption of children by gay or lesbians is constitutional); accord, In re Adoption 
ofT.KJ. and KAK, 1996 WL 316800 (1996). A few cases have recognized visitation or 
custody claims by lesbian, non-biological parents. See AC. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. 
Ct. App.) cert. denied, 827 P.2d 837 (N.M. 1992). A few jurisdictions are recognizing the 
right of a lesbian partner to adopt a child conceived through artificial insemination. See In 
re Evans, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (N.Y. 1992); In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A2d 837 (D.C. 
1995). 
82. See generally Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44. 
83. In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio P. Ct. 1987) (holding that, despite sex reas-
signment surgery, a male-to-female transsexual remains a male because of original gender 
attribution at birth). 
84. See Able v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (issuing injunction 
against enforcement of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" military policy on First and Fifth 
Amendment grounds). 
85. See cases cited supra notes 68-69. 
86. See generally Franke, supra note 25; Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys, 
supra note 9. 
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"gender rebels,,,87 when their dress, attitudes, behavior and/or identity step 
out of the governing masculine!male-feminine/female identity framework and 
into a context in which gender ambiguity sets the norm. Yet, as long as we 
value gender bipolarity or sexual dimorphism over the concept of gender as 
a product of social construction, we limit our freedom to express our sexual 
identity. 88 The fear of Micki, for example, was premised on the belief that 
s/he could presumably never be a woman because s/he, though quiet, demure 
and feminine, betrayed her experience as a man by displaying a self-
confident demeanor not typical of women. 89 
To put this theoretical discussion into more concrete terms, consider the 
following. At the fifth annual Transgender Conference in Houston, Texas, 
in July 1996, a speaker identified himself as James Green, an FTM who had 
lived as a lesbian in the San Francisco community for several years before 
taking the step to use hormones and eventually become a female-to-male 
transsexual. For Green, who stayed with the same lesbian lover often years 
after the surgery, use of the label and category "lesbian" suddenly becomes 
complicated. Does his partner lose her lesbian status because her former 
partner was once a woman and is now a man? Martine Rothblatt poses a 
series of interesting questions in this regard: 
Is the lovemate of a person with a vagina who uses a strap-on dildo 
gay or straight? Does it matter if that lovemate has a vagina or a 
penis when the other partner feels as if she is a male? Are they still 
lesbians if the partner lives, dresses, and thinks of "herself' as a 
man? Are they still lesbians if the partner has had a hysterectomy to 
eliminate "her" period? What if "she" also had a voluntary breast 
87. The ultimate gender rebel is one who, after a sex change operation, insists on mak-
ing him(her)self the member of a "heterosexual" couple for the purposes of enjoying such 
privileges reserved exclusively for gender conformists as the right to marry. See In re La-
drach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832-33 (refusing to issue marriage license to a man and a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual on grounds that petitioner was still male since a per-
son's "true sex" is that assigned to them at birth). 
88. The term "sexual identity" has been freely used in gay and lesbian literature to 
capture the hybrid physiological and political aspects of adopting a "gay" identity. As de-
fined by John De Cecco and Michael Shiveley, sexual identity is comprised of 1) biological 
sex (assigned at birth); 2) one's conviction of being female or male (gender identity); 3) 
femininity or maSCUlinity (according to social norms); and 4) sexual orientation (which is 
not just erotic interests, but also includes emotional affect and sexual behavior). John P. 
De Cecco & Michael G. Shiveley, From Sexual Identity to Sexual Relationships: A Con-
textual Shift, in ORIGINS OF SEXUALITY AND HOMOSEXUALITY 1-26 (John P. De Cecco & 
Michael G. Shively eds., 1985). 
89. Of course, such conclusions seriously undermine the feminist project of convincing 
our male-dominated society that the biological differences between men and women nei-
ther explain nor limit women's social contributions, except in limited ways during preg-
nancy. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 
1007-13 (1984) (favoring "special treatment" model for sex-specific conditions, but 
stressing that classifications based on "women's differences" must be carefully scrutinized 
to avoid perpetuating unfair gender stereotypes). 
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removal operation to give "her" a malelike chest? At what point are 
the couple no longer lesbians but instead just having unique sex?90 
These questions should encourage us to consider the creation of transition 
vocabulary which is non-stereotyping and respectful of sex and gender 
identity choices. 
V. SEEING THE WEB OF OPPRESSION IN A HETERO-
PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY: AN APPEAL FOR HOLISM IN THE 
POLITICS OF IDENTITY 
My goal in this essay has been only to glimpse at the roots of activism 
and theorizing which appear unduly committed to bipolar and essentialist 
thinking in matters of sex and gender, paralleling the bipolarism of 
WhitelBlack in race relations which infuses this nation.91 Bipolarism can 
never reflect the diversity of the world in which we live. In the area of race 
categories, for example, bipolarism encourages us to ignore our being sur-
rounded by individuals who do not neatly fit into the paradigm of 
BlacklWhite. Racially, there are African-Americans who pass for white, 
Hispanics with Anglo or European names and faces, Black Asians, and 
White Native-Americans, as well as European-Americans whose ancestry 
has been subsumed under the catchall label "white." The same blurring of 
boundaries is found along male/female and heterosexuallhomosexual lines. 
There are intersectional queers who experience discrimination as Black gay 
men, Latina lesbians, and Black or Hispanic transgendered queers. Al-
though the boundaries of categories like race, gender and sex are quite 
blurred when we look beyond the experience of the mostly white and/or het-
erosexual people who have dominated the legal discourse, our activism and 
our social theorizing have nonetheless not allowed for race or gender ambi-
guity.92 Nor has our experience in the courts. Not surprisingly, plaintiffs in 
90. ROTHBLATT, supra note 17, at 143-44. 
91. See Charles R. Lawrence ill, The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning to 
Think and Talk About Race, Again, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 1-18 (1995). 
92. The impact of the arbitrary analysis of race and sex affecting contemporary social 
and legal discourse is illustrated by the inconsistent policies of government entities which 
have tried to implement much needed affirmative action policies. Efforts have been typi-
cally made only to increase the representation of Blacks and Hispanics, and to enforce the 
false notion that Asians don't need affirmative action and don't experience invidious dis-
crimination. 
This "model minority" image of Asians, based on notions of racial stratification and 
blatant stereotypes, has been severely critiqued. See Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights 
and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome, " in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW 106 (Leslie Bender & 
Daan Braveman eds., 1995). Such stereotyped rhetoric discourages the recognition of 
blurred or intersectional racial identities. For example, Black Asians, who might want to 
identifY themselves with more than one racial/ethnic group, are often discouraged from 
marking more than one identity box on an application form. Thus, official policy often re-
flects muddled perspectives which unwittingly perpetuate racial stratification/splitting and 
racial ideologies which encourage people to believe that some persons will "naturally" 
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discrimination suits are discouraged from introducing dual or compound 
factors to explain their discriminatory treatment, even where the facts would 
sustain an interrelated function of the categories (e.g., race and sexual orien-
tation).93 
The feminist and lesbian/gay communities thus need to connect their 
theorizing to the transgenderists' developing discourse on gender oppression. 
In the late twentieth century, this topic is not just about adding another as-
pect to the burgeoning politics of sexual identity. It is as important to femi-
nist theory as it is to critical race theorists, who are seeking to deconstruct 
and interconnect the roles of race and class oppression in American culture. 
We need to see all aspects of the sex/gender gender/sexual orientation or the 
race/color/ethnicity question from the perspective that our beliefs can dan-
gerously be affected by essentialist attitudes, whether they are about the 
sexed or racialized body.94 If you are lesbian, gay, a woman, or heterosex-
ual, the transgendered experience may not be your experience, but the 
thinking that undergirds their discrimination must be made our experience. 
In reflecting on the diversity of our lesbian, gay and bisexual commu-
nity, we should be reminded of the historical presence of the transgendered 
individual-as once having been the cross-dressers of the nineteenth century, 
the drag queens of the fifiies,95 and having become the partially or fully 
queer/trans gender FTMs or MTFs of today. 96 White and middle-class lesbi-
(because of [presumptively homogenous] color, class, race) gravitate to the top and others 
to the bottom. 
The recent spate of efforts to undo affirmative action in the universities is one ex-
pression of this ideology, which fuels divisiveness among minorities and which prevents 
the coalitional activism needed to create a truly diverse and compatible co-existence of 
multicultural and multi-racial/gendered Americans. See Norimitsu Onishi, Affirmative 
Action: Choosing Sides, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1996, at Education Life 26-35; see also 
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming right of white plaintiffs who 
charged University of Texas School of Law admissions policy as racially discriminatory to 
be admitted under an admissions program which does not use race to a) obtain a diverse 
student body, b) alter the school's reputation in the community, c) combat the school's 
perceived hostile environment toward minorities, or d) remedy the present effects of past 
discrimination by actors other than the law school). 
93. See, e.g., Williamson v. Edwards & Sons, 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 1089 (1990) (dismissing Title VII claim of race-based sexual orientation dis-
crimination by Black gay man on grounds that harassment was based more on homosexu-
ality than race, and therefore not prohibited under the statute; court thereby ignored pos-
sibility that discrimination for membership in one social group may be compounded by 
membership in another). 
94. Mary Eaton, Homosexual Unmodified: Speculations on Law's Discourse, Race, and 
the Construction of Sexual Identity, in LEGAL INVERSIONS: LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE 
POLITICS OF LAW 46 (Didi Herman & Carl Stychin eds., 1995). 
95. Elvia R. Arriola, Faeries, Marimachas, Queens and Lezzies: The Construction of 
Homosexuality Before the 1969 Stonewall Riots, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 33 (1995). 
96. Although they exist in smaller numbers, female-to-male transsexuals (FTMs) en-
gender as much curiosity as butch lesbians, particularly in their search for an identity 
which accommodates their never having felt female but also never having felt a part of the 
lesbian separatist movement. See Deva, FTMIFemale-to-Male: An Interview with Mike, 
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ans who are afraid of male-to-female transsexuals unfortunately assume that 
all MTFs are pseudo white men, or former white gay men, or some such 
variation on the antithesis of their own identity. That false consciousness 
ignores the intersections of race and class which also impact on the lives of 
transgendered individuals,97 some of whom in other times would have been 
the lesbianlgaylbiltransvestites of their era, long before the civil rights 
movements of Blacks, women, and queers changed America's social and 
political history. The moment we resist the transgendered female because 
she evokes our distrust as women or lesbians for the residual power of male 
privilege, we might as well reject all the others who have been "queer" in the 
past; we might as well throw out the story of the Stonewall Riots as having 
sparked a lesbian and gay civil rights movement because the primary actors 
on that night were transgendered people.98 We might as well in that rejection 
throw out anyone who defies the closeted, straight-looking gender conform-
ists and all those whose lives exist out of the mainstream white gay/lesbian 
activism of today--poor/working class, Black, Latino, very butch/femme, 
partial transgendered drags, etc. 
Transgenderism, then, pertains to feminist, lesbian and queer theory. 
How people react to the subject, and to the persons seemingly affected by 
the analysis (MTFs or FTMs), is a painful reminder that progressive theoriz-
ing can dangerously internalize the values of the dominant culture. We must 
resist hegemonic approaches which falsely suggest that the gender, the 
"lesbian," or the queer label applies to one category of easily defmed people. 
For, you and I may occasionally share a common label, yet how each of us 
defmes and experiences that label (e.g., lesbian) is completely dependent on 
time, place, manner, historical, social and cultural context. Whether our ap-
proach to dismantling the rule of law/menlwhiteslheterosexuals in our lives 
uses gender, or lesbianism, or race/color/ethnicity as categories of analysis, 
our quests must look at the elements of the "hard cases." 
As a feminist, I am not satisfied with the notion that the consciousness-
raising (CR) techniques for dismantling "gender oppression" used in the sev-
enties are useful only to girls/women who are the victims of harassment, 
rape, child abuse and incest, or that the old methodology and form of CR 
groups must remain the same today.99 If little girls are capable of being 
Eric, Billy, Sky and Shadow, in DAGGER: ON BUTCH WOMEN 154 (Lily Burana & Roxxie 
Linnea Due eds., 1994). 
97. See, e.g., PARIS IS BURNING (Miramax 1991), a film poignantly documenting the 
positive outlook and equally tragic existence of New York City's Hispanic and Black gay 
drag queens, and transgenders, many of whom survive by petty thievery and hustling for 
sex. The range of gendered identities can boggle the mind as many of these individuals 
define their "gay identity" not solely by homosexual sex but also by way of their explora-
tion of cross-gendered identities, whether in the form of drag, transvestism, or partial or 
full transsexual operations leading to the creation of "female" identities. 
98. MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL 197 (1993). 
99. This proposal suggests that it may be a destabilizing, yet necessary, move for femi-
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abused in a heterosexist and patriarchal society, so are little boys. If adoles-
cent girls are capable of being denied the right to explore their sexual differ-
ence by way of sexual behavior with other girls or by playing with 
butch/fern identities, then so are adolescent boys. If gender oppression so 
harms our youth,l00 it harms those who didn't take the steps to defy the gen-
der oppression of their childhood/youth until they became "women," "men," 
or even "lesbians." 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We need to expand the rhetoric we are using to explore the meaning of 
gender or sexual oppression, making it inclusive and interconnected with our 
struggles to deconstruct the meanings of race or class oppression. This is 
necessary because these movements are all united in the search for a mean-
ingful concept of identity which would allow us to afftrm our differences--
with the progressive end goal, presumably, of destroying unfair stereotypes 
and uniting with others on a higher plane of existence. Contemporary soci-
ety expresses tremendous hostility towards its gender rebels--which include 
everyone from the middle-class gay man and lesbian woman, to working-
class gays, butch lesbians, white or BlacklHispanic transsexuals, rich and 
poor cross-dressers, full- and part-time transgendered, gay male drags, and 
so on.101 The varied potential in this list illustrates how limited our current 
vocabulary is for seeing sex, gender, race and class as continuous and inter-
connected concepts, all or some of which may collide in one person's experi-
ence of "oppression. " Yet there are cultures, even in America, where gender 
and racial fluidity are the norm of social existence, so I do not speak of a 
hypothetical society. 102 Only sex and gender stereotyping grow out of the 
nists to broaden the meaning of consciQusness-raising to include the formation of support 
groups which will probably be predominately, but not exclusively, female. The groups 
should continue the reading, writing, teaching and distribution of feminist ideas in order to 
expand the visionary work toward a world where sex, gender identity and sexuality exist 
as continuous rather than bipolar and rigid concepts used to divide people. 
100. See Elvia R. Arriola, The Penalties for Puppy Love: Institutionalized Violence 
Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered Youth, U. IOWA J. GENDER, RACE & 
JUST. (forthcoming 1997). 
101. An excellent example of contemporary oppression is the recently enacted Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), which is intended to 
fend off the impact of a Hawaii Supreme Court ruling in the plaintiffs' favor in the re-trial 
of Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). DOMA allows states to refuse to acknowl-
edge legal same-sex marriages obtained in other jurisdictions. 
102. It is interesting that the legal culture which generated the most expansive reading of 
sex-based discrimination so as to recognize the right of lesbian and gay couples to not be 
discriminated against in the issuance of marriage licenses, see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 
44, arises from a social culture that is permeated with the norm of gender and racial ambi-
guity. The historic Polynesian influence in Hawaiian culture (including Tahitians and Sa-
moans) has long recognized the social identity of the mahu, cross-dressers and transgen-
dered individuals whose discrimination on the mainland U.S. is strong, but on the islands 
is tempered by the Hawaiian belief that it is natural for some men to spend their lives in 
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insistence to divide people into two sexes. We need to begin to see our sex-
ual and gender identities as being as unique as our personalities. That pos-
sibility should encourage feminist, lesbian/gay or queer theorists to shed the 
arrogance and prejudice which induce them to stereotype the transgendered 
and to question their motives. For their quest seems highly compatible with 
that of feminists, lesbians or queers--to undermine the role that the law and 
the science of sex, or hetero-patriarchal notions about sex, gender and 
sexuality, play in the second-class treatment of women and/or other 
sex/gender rebels. Introducing and examining the resistance to the topic of 
transgenderism should encourage us to re-examine our notions of respect for 
difference and diversity. It should also encourage us to become even more 
critical about the role we should give to biological essentialism in defIning 
the boundaries of race, class, gender, and sexuality. 
"feminine" roles and to dress and act like females and even become the passive sexual 
partners of men. Lisa Hardie, The Socio-Cultural Context for the Decision in Baehr v. 
Lewin 6 (1996) (unpublished student paper, University of Texas (Austin)) (on file with 
author). 
